The Unknown Known

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1

Let me put up this next memo.

You want me to read this?

Yes, please.

"February 4, 2004.

Subject:
What you know.

There are known knowns.

There are known unknowns.

There are unknown unknowns.

But there are also

unknown knowns.

That is to say,

things that you think you know

that it turns out

you did not."

I wonder if in the future

public figures will write

as many memos as I did.

I doubt it.

I must have gotten

in the habit of dictating

things that were important.

Not a diary.

Not a journal.

They're almost all

working documents.

Now, they've become historical

documents in retrospect,

but at the time,

they all had a purpose.

In the later years

of my using the dictaphone,

why, they were called

snowflakes,

because they were

on white paper.

What would you say

the total number of memos

might be?

They said I dictated 20,000

just in the last six years

at the Pentagon.

There have to be millions.

"July 27, 2001."

A memo to Condoleezza Rice

concerning Iraq.

"We have discussed Iraq

on a number of occasions.

The discussions

have been inconclusive.

Sanctions are being limited

in a way that cannot weaken

Saddam Hussein.

We can publicly acknowledge

that the sanctions don't work

over extended periods

and stop the pretense

of having a policy

that is keeping Saddam

'in the box'

when we know he has crawled

a good distance out of the box.

Within a few years,

the U.S. will undoubtedly

have to confront

a Saddam armed

with nuclear weapons.

If Saddam's regime

were oustered,

we would have

a much-improved position

in the region

and elsewhere."

Why the obsession

with Iraq and Saddam?

Well, you love that word,

"obsession."

I can see the glow

in your face when you say it.

Well, I'm an obsessive person.

Are you? I'm not.

I'm...

I'm cool.

I'm measured.

If you look

at the range of my memos,

there might be 1/10 of 1%

about Iraq.

The reason I was concerned

about Iraq

is 'cause four-star generals

would come to me and say,

"Mr. secretary,

we have a problem.

Our orders are to fly over

the northern part of Iraq

and the Southern part of Iraq

on a daily basis,

with the Brits,

and we are getting shot at.

At some moment...

could be tomorrow,

could be next month,

could be next year...

one of our planes

is gonna be shot down

and our pilots and crews

are gonna be killed

or they're gonna be

captured."

The question will be,

"what in the world were

we flying those flights for?

What was

the cost-benefit ratio?

What was our country gaining?"

So you sit down and you say,

"I think I'm gonna see

if I can get

the president's attention.

Remind him that our planes

are being shot at,

remind him that we don't have

a fresh policy for Iraq,

and remind him that we've got

a whole range of options."

Not an obsession.

A very measured,

nuanced approach,

I think.

In my confirmation hearing

when I was nominated

to be secretary of defense,

the best question

I was asked was,

"what do you worry about

when you go to bed at night?"

And my answer was, in effect,

"intelligence.

The danger

that we can be surprised

because of

a failure of imagining

what might happen

in the world."

There are known knowns,

the things we know we know.

There are known unknowns,

the things we know

we don't know.

There are also

that third category

of unknown unknowns,

the things we don't know

we don't know.

And you can only know more

about those things

by imagining what they might be.

Pearl harbor was

a failure of imagination.

We didn't know we didn't know

that they could do what they

did the way they did it.

We had people working

on breaking codes.

We had people thinking through,

"what are the kinds of things

they might do?"

And lo and behold,

the carriers were able to,

on a Sunday morning,

get very close to Hawaii,

launch their planes, and

impose enormous destruction.

Was it failure of imagination

or failure to look

at the intelligence

that was available?

They had thought through

a great many

more obvious possibilities.

People were chasing

the wrong rabbit.

That one possibility

was not something

that they had imagined

was likely.

"July 23, 2001.

Subject:

'Pearl harbor post-mortem.'

in some future hearing,

I am going to say

that I do not want

to be sitting before this panel

in a modern-day version

of a pearl harbor post-mortem:

Who didn't do what,

when, where, and why.

None of us would want

to have to be back here

going through that agony."

A month or so before

September 11, 2001,

it would be wrong to think

that someone who wrote it...

namely me, was prescient.

I wasn't.

I simply had read enough history

that I worried.

American 11, climb,

maintain flight level 350.

American 11, climb,

maintain flight level 350.

American 11, Boston.

The American on the frequency,

how do you hear me?

American 11,

if you hear Boston center

re-contact Boston center

on 127.82.

That's American 11, 127.82.

My military assistant,

admiral Ed Giambastiani,

came in and said,

"a plane has hit

the world trade center."

It was assumed

to be an accident.

And I went into my office

from the conference room,

and admiral Giambastiani said,

"another plane has hit

the other world

trade center tower."

And of course, at that point,

it wasn't an accident;

It was an attack.

Within minutes,

I felt the Pentagon shake.

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