The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara

Is this chart at a reasonable height for you?

Or do you want it lowered?

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- All right.

Earlier tonight...

Let me first ask the TV.

Are you ready?

All set?

Let me hear your voice level,

so it's the same.

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Terrific.

Now, I remember exactly

the sentence I left off on.

I remember how it started,

and I was cut off in the middle.

You can fix it up.

I don't want to go back, because

I know exactly what I wanted to say.

- Go ahead!

- Okay.

Any military commander

who is honest with himself...

...or with those he's speaking to will admit...

...that he has made mistakes

in the application of military power.

He's killed people, unnecessarily.

His own troops or other troops.

Through mistakes,

through errors of judgment.

A hundred, or thousands, or tens of

thousands, maybe even 100,000.

But he hasn't destroyed nations.

And the conventional wisdom is...

...don't make the same mistake twice.

Learn from your mistakes.

And we all do. Maybe we make

the same mistake three times...

...but hopefully not four or five.

There'll be no learning period

with nuclear weapons.

Make one mistake

and you're gonna destroy nations.

In my life, I've been part of wars.

Three years in the U.S. Army

during World War ll.

Seven years as secretary of defense

during the Vietnam War.

Thirteen years at the World Bank.

Across the world.

At my age, 85...

...l'm at an age where I can look back...

...and derive some conclusions

about my actions.

My rule has been, 'try to learn.'

Try to understand what happened.

Develop the lessons and pass them on.

This is the secretary of defense of

the United States, Robert McNamara.

His department absorbs 10 percent

of the income of this country...

... and over half of every tax dollar.

His job has been called

the toughest in Washington...

... and he is the most controversial

figure that has ever held the job.

Walter Lippmann calls him both

the best secretary of defense...

... and the first one to ever assert

civilian control over the military.

His critics call him a 'con man,'

'an IBM machine with legs'...

...'an arrogant dictator.'

Mr. Secretary, I've noticed

in several cabinet offices...

... that little silver calendar thing there.

Can you explain that?

Yes, this was given by President Kennedy.

... 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23...

... 24, 25, 26, 27, and finally 28,

were the dates...

... when we literally look ed down

the gun barrel into nuclear war.

Under a cloak of deceit...

...the Soviet Union introduced

nuclear missiles...

...into Cuba...

...targeting 90 million Americans.

The CIA said the warheads

had not been delivered yet.

They thought 20 were coming

on a ship named the Poltava.

We mobilized 180,000 troops.

The first day's air attack

was planned at 1080 sorties...

...a huge air attack.

Kennedy was trying to keep us out of war.

I was trying to help him keep us out of war.

And General Curtis LeMay,

whom I served under...

...as a matter of fact,

in World War ll, was saying:

' Let's go in.

Let's totally destroy Cuba.'

On that critical Saturday,

October 27th...

...we had two Khrushchev

messages in front of us.

One had come in Friday night,

and it had been dictated...

...by a man who was either drunk,

or under tremendous stress.

Basically, he said, ' If you'll

guarantee you won't invade Cuba...

...we'll take the missiles out.'

Then, before we could respond,

we had a second message...

...that had been dictated

by a bunch of hard-liners.

And it said, in effect, ' If you attack...

...we're prepared...

...to confront you with

masses of military power.'

So, what to do? We had the

soft message and the hard message.

At the elbow of President Kennedy

was Tommy Thompson...

...former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow.

He and Jane, his wife, had lived with

Khrushchevand his wife on occasion.

Tommy Thompson said,

' Mr. President...

...I urge you to respond to the soft message.'

The president said to Tommy,

'We can't. That'll get us nowhere.'

Tommy said,

' Mr. President, you're wrong.'

Now, that takes a lot of guts.

In Thompson's mind was this thought:

' Khrushchev's gotten

himself in a hell of a fix.'

He would then think to himself,

' My God...

...if I can get out of this with a deal

that I can say to the Russian people:

'Kennedy was going to destroy

Castro and I prevented it.'

Thompson, knowing Khrushchev

as he did, thought:

' Khrushchevwill accept that.'

And Thompson was right.

That's what I call empathy.

We must try to put ourselves

inside their skin...

...and look at us through their eyes...

...just to understand the thoughts...

...that lie behind their decisions

and their actions.

Khrushchev's advisors were saying:

'There can be no deal...

...unless you somewhat

reduce the pressure on us...

...when you ask us to reduce

the pressure on you.'

Also, we had attempted to invade Cuba.

Well, with the Bay of Pigs. That

undoubtedly influenced their thinking.

I think that's correct.

But more importantly, from a Cuban

and a Russian point of view...

...they knew what, in a sense,

I really didn't know.

We had attempted to assassinate Castro...

...under Eisenhower and Kennedy,

and later, under Johnson.

And in addition to that, major voices

in the U.S. Were calling for invasion.

In the first message,

Khrushchevsaid this:

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