No End in Sight

By Charles Ferguson
to his leadership, mister Presidente...
in this unincluded war
and stranger...
the first war of the XXIst century.
Good is not known, it did not understand itself well...
it to the people...
but I know with certain safety
that, with the time...
his contributions
they will be registered in the history.
NO END IN SIGH THANK YOU, the USA.
We condemn with hardness the criminal action
of the forces of the USA.
We are sorry about this catastrophe
to hands of the evil.
We demand the execution
of the unfaithful Wahabi
that receive support of the USA.
They have been arrested
and admitted his guilt
opposite to the presents.
We demand his execution.
On May 1, 2003,
the president George W. Bush...
declared a high place in the operations
said...
" In the war of Iraq, the USA.
and our Allied Forces have prevailed ".
Four years later, after 3.000 dead persons...
and 20.000 American injured men,
Iraq has disintegrated in the chaos.
Baghdad suffers from ten
to fifteen bombings a day...
ADVISER OF IRAQ IN THE OCCUPATION
... perhaps 50 deceased in act of service...
but I suspect
that about that does not speak to himself very much.
Probably, only I came to us
a third of what happens actually.
Million Iraqis
they have no drinking water...
treatment of residual waters
not even electricity from the invasion.
Baghdad, with six million inhabitants...
she has been submitted to a curfew from March, 2006.
More than three million Iraqis they have fled to the nearby countries. of civil deaths it promotes 600.000. Those who die are lucky...
IRAQI JOURNALIST IN the USA. but those who live, are dead in life. The west and the north of Iraq it is controlled by the insurgents.
MANAGER IN BAGHDAD The rest of Iraq it is controlled by the militias. Two Moslem principal groups, the majority chita and the minority sun... they are more and more conflicting. They executed them for being sunes. We were living together up to today. It is an Iranian wave against us. An Iranian wave. We are Moslem. How is it possible? They say that they are the Army of Mahdi. Is this what this army does? Look what it has obtained. , that see his face. From January, 2003 until January, 2005... I was a president of the National Council of Intelligence. We write the first estimation of rebellion in Iraq. It was bad news. It was presenting situations bad, worse and the awful. The president corrected it of guesswork of press... corrected it of insecurity and opposition to the government. What I gave to understand the fact was that the president had not read it. This is the history of the invasion of Iraq for the USA. In that many persons they tried to save a nation. On September 11, 2001 it was
a beautiful clear and clear day.  
It was returning of the hairdressing salon of the pentagon...  
THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC POLITICS  
for my office  
a glance to the TV set...  

SAFETY CHAMBER:  

OF THE PENTAGON:  
We do not hear to smash to the plane,  
at least, I did not hear it.  
Suddenly,  
it was as if the Earth was opened.  
I saw the fire-ball and, I must say...  
that, on having seen her, I thought that  
it would not go out hence lively.  
The plane had smashed  
under our office area.  
The office of budget...  
where 38 persons died,  
it was just below...  
and the new center of control of the marina  
it was two apartments further down.  
There were no survivors  
in these two sections.  
Osama Bin Laden...  
because another terrorist did not occur to me...  
that could have organized something like that.  
think it immediately?  
Immediately.  
One month after September 11,  
The USA . invaded Afghanistan...  
in search of Al Qaeda  
and of Osama Bin Laden.  
But before the war of Afghanistan,  
some tall officials...  
another target...  
one that had not anything in common  
with the attacks of 11S.  
When the attack of the pentagon,  

EXPERT ANALYST OF IRAQ  
INTELLIGENCE OF DEFENSE
I suppose that the following thing that happened... the fact was that they assigned to us to look immediately a relation... between Saddam and Al Qaeda. I went to speak directly with the group of antiterrorism... with the analyst chief of Iraq. The two met some days... and we analyze all the historical reports that we could find. Was CuI his conclusion? We conclude that there was no relation. helps and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda. We watch the participation of Iraq in terrorist activities. What I want to highlight today... it is the connection potentially much more sinister between Iraq... and the terrorist network of Al Qaeda. We do not want that of smoke of gun pass to atomic cloud.

**WRITER:**
Iraq is full of vagrants... they will put them in ships... they will give them chemical biological weapon... and they will order them flying from the ships... to attack the east coast of the USA. It is a fantastic world. I do not know what these people were smoking... but it had to be of good quality. politics of George W. Bush... Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz... they directed the administration towards the war of Iraq. Condolezza Rice accompanied them. Colin Powell and Richard Armitage... the only tall officials with experience in combat... they expressed his worries, but they supported to the administration in public.
HISTORY:
The advisers of Bush
they were treating with Saddam Hussein...
since I was invading Iran in 1980...
in a brutal war that
it was paid by almost a million dead persons.
Iraq used chemical weapon...
against the military men
and the civil innocent Iranians.
Saddam invested million dollars...
in programs of biological weapon,
chemical and nuclear...
while it was murdering 300,000
of your own citizens.
But the administration of Reagan,
being afraid to Iran...
attended to Saddam with military intelligence
helps.
Donald Rumsfeld met
with Saddam in 1983.
Colin Powell was the adviser
of national safety of Reagan...
from 1987 to 1989.
The 80s were summed up in the horrible one
although developer documented...
WRITER Y CATEDRTICA
of 1987...
that was saying that human rights
and chemical separate weapon, eat...
our interests
those will be equipped with Iraq.
The war between Iran and Iraq
it remained in deadlock in 1988.
THE FIRST WAR OF THE GULF
In 1990, Saddam invades Kuwait.
A coalition guided by the USA.
expels it in a war...
planned by Dick Cheney,
the secretary of that time of defense...
Paul Wolfowitz,
the undersecretary of that time of defense...
and Colin Powell, the of that time one
president of the joint staff.
Bush senior incites the Iraqis to a coup d'état against Saddam. The blood effusion...

... they take the justice as his hand... and demolish the dictator Saddam Hussein. But when the chitas of the south of Iraq they subset sail... the administration stops that Saddam squashes them. 14 of 18 Iraqi provinces... AMBASSADOR DE IRAQ EN THE UNO ... the rebels were controlling them... when general Schwartzkopf it allowed Saddam Hussein... to use the helicopters of combat... to massacre the rebels, men, women and children. The armistice of 1991 it is required that Iraq should disarm itself... but Saddam refuses. It results in the fall of the economy of Iraq... for the sequestration of the UNO that comes into force in 1993... and that continues during Clinton's administration. The favored elite does not suffer it... but the Iraqis of on foot they rush to the extreme poverty... to the Islamic fundamentalism. In 1993, when George Bush senior visits Kuwait... Saddam tries to murder it. Seven years later, his son he is elected a president of the USA. When you see the same architects of political those... on the one hand, speaking on... to straighten up what went out badly in 1991... to finish what they began... it was tantalizing to think that had learned something.
Saddam Hussein and his children
they must leave Iraq in 48 hours.
A denial
it would result in military conflict...
beginning it is we who will decide.
PRESIDENTIAL BOARD
OF NATIONAL SAFETY NUMBER 24
If the beginning wants to be dated
of the disaster of the postwar period of Iraq...
it would have to be January 20, 2003...
when Bush signed without, for what I know...
JOURNALIST AND WRITER
discussion
in the White House or the administration...
the presidential board
of national safety number 24...
that was granting the control of Iraq
to the Pentagon after the war.
This document did of Donald Rumsfeld...
in the postwar period of Iraq.
This war was conceived
number of persons...
THE DIRECTOR OF THE GROUP
OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
... of the administration of Bush.
They had a vision
very ingenuous of what it was Iraq...
and of what the Iraqis

On having formulated his opinion
on Iraq after the fall of Saddam...
in a man called Ahmed Chalabi.
From 1992,
Chalabi had been a president...
of the National Iraqi Congress, or CNI.
was not waking up confidence in general...
since Chalabi had been a reprobate
in Jordan for bank fraud.
The intelligence considered
his slightly trustworthy information...
or even fraudulent.
Ideally,
they were lying...
and at the worst, they were inciting.
If it was a source of the CNI... the analysts were receiving it skeptics. But it was not like that for the creators of political. Chalabi assured that the postwar period of Iraq... it would be pro American and easy to stabilize... especially, if the proper Chalabi was to the control. So the plan was, in extract... to be approximately three or four months... to restore a government exiles' compound... with Ahmed Chalabi to the head... and, then, in August or September, 2003... to begin the drastic one reduction of the troops. Larry Di Rita communicated to us in a circular letter... that at the end of August, 2003... SPOKESMAN DE DEFENSA ... only they would stay in Iraq from 25,000 to 30,000 troops. I heard it saying it in the persons' fourth full house... to my companions... says. "It is physically impossible". The Future project of Iraq ... a study of 13 volumes on the postwar period of Iraq... it was ignored by the Pentagon. It was debated very much. THE DIRECTOR OF THE PROGRAM OF NATIONAL SAFETY There were tons of volumes on how should we do it. Almost not at all it integrated... in the idea of the Pentagon. My frustration...

CHIEF OF STAFF:
OF BREAD STICK POWELL
... and that of the secretary they grew...
on having seen our elegant planning,
our detailed planning...
completely discarded...
and to the people who had realized it...
completely discarded...
so that the most loyal people...
of the visions
of the republican party...
they could be renowned
for key positions in Iraq.

THE WAR:
In this moment, the forces
of the coalition and those of EE.UU...
they begin
the military operations...
to disarm Iraq, to liberate his people...
and to defend to the world of a serious danger.
believed...
that was an important work
was thinking...
LIEUTENANT OF THE MARINA
that would not be happy in the life...
... knowing that another people
it had fought for my freedom.
I joined the army for...
OF the USA.
... to support to my country...
and I thought that it was slightly positive.
It was an honor...
GUNNER OF the USA.
... to go out to help
to my welded partners...
to do what they say to us
that it is necessary to do...
perhaps to demolish a dictator...
to restore a democracy.
was wishing it to begin
the war because it was...
the only beam of hope that it had...
and when it happened,
it was very moved.
slowly...
but they would go towards one better future.
Thank you, mister Bush.
We like very much mister Bush!
Not, not to Saddam! Yes, yes to Bush!
Not, not to Saddam! Yes, yes to Bush!
Look what it has done,
look what it has done to him to Iraq!
It was a hopeful place,
frightened, noisy, confused...
quite mixed.
saw children with balaclava
that " FBI " were saying...
JOURNALIST IN BAGHDAD
FROM APRIL 15, 2003
... and the thumbs were raising me.
And other young boys...
possibly, fedayines of civil...
they were looking at me with hardness...
and they were evaluating me...
of the car.
The Iraqis were hoping to see...
JOURNALIST AND WRITER
IN BAGHDAD FROM JULY, 2003
... what was going to bear them.
had not been
pushed back by the Iraqis.
Not to Saddam, not to Saddam!
I have seen the people receiving
the troops of the coalition...
because we think that
everything it was planned, prepared.
There they have it.
During the Second World war,
the EE.UU...
you started gliding
the occupation of Germany...
two years earlier...
but the administration of Bush
it did not create the organization...
that would take charge
of the occupation of Iraq...
up to 60 days before the invasion.
The ORHA, the office
for the reconstruction...
and the humanitarian aid...
was reporting directly
to the secretary of defender Rumsfeld.
They called me from the office of the secretary
of defense at the end of January.
They wanted that I was taking charge...

**MANAGER ORHA:**
... of humanitarian matters.
Jay Garner, general of the retired army,
it was chosen to direct the ORHA.
In the first War of the Gulf,
it had directed 22,000 soldiers...
in humanitarian operations...
in the Kurdish area of the north of Iraq.
would take charge of the whole country.
Was he considered prepared to direct Iraq?
I do not believe that never
we were prepared...
To prepare would take us years
a company of this magnitude.
Nobody had years.
They called me cellular me.
SUPERVISED BY BAGHDAD FOR the USA.
...
saying to me
that Rich Armitage was looking for me...
wanted that it was returning
to Washington immediately.
Ambassadress Barbara Bodine
it put itself supervised by Baghdad...
only three weeks before the war.
She was a diplomatic official
with experience...
that had served in Yemen, Iraq...
and that had been a hostage
in Kuwait five months...
after the invasion of Saddam in 1990.
It belonged to few experts
in the Middle East...
that the Pentagon ordered Iraq.
One of the few ones.
I believed that they had been wrong...
They believed that it would be easy to handle...
Pero Barbara is
of the hardest of the service.
In 2003, colonel Paul Hughes...
it was taking in the Pentagon 6 years...
in works of planning and strategy...
for expert officials of Defense.
I ended up by being destined...
to the office of reconstruction
and humanitarian aid...
with Jay Garner.
I was his director of strategic politics.
The ORHA started working in
the Pentagon 50 days before the invasion.
They gave us an office complex...
of years...
there were no computers,
the people were coming every day...

was asking:
There was no personnel.
It did not even have a secretary.
Only there was a meeting
in the University of National Defense...
and I believe that the unanimous opinion...
of the people who was present at this meeting...
with that I spoke then...

it was:
It was our first meeting...
and they were not offering us
too much safety...
because, basically...
the only thing that we did was to meet us.
It was not structured at all.
There were no plans. None by no means.
On March 16, the ORHA
one displaced Kuwait.
167 persons accompanied us.
167 persons who would turn...
in the government of a country of 25 millions.
BAGHDAD, ON APRIL 9, 2003
After the fall of Baghdad...
we did not know what was going to happen...
and it was obvious that it had not glided at all.
What they were telling us...
the fact was that we would embark...
after one or two months of,
basically, to conquer Iraq.
When the troops of the USA entered
in the capital, they began the plundering.
In Kuwait...
we were so given
to the TV set as the others.
We realized
was reigning the disorder...
and the chaos in Iraq.
The Americans were not doing anything.
They were stopping in intersections...
but they were not going down the vehicles...
or of the tanks to do nothing.
and we did not see any progress.
The only progress
it was the uncontrolled freedom.
The looters wanted to come
of the government...
and even to private companies.
The plundering stemmed partly
at the level of the troops...
and to the sensation that Rumsfeld
it transmitted his commanders...
and these to his subordinates...
of that we were not there
to govern Iraq...
and to go out.
We are not under the martial law.
COMMANDER DE THE ALLIED FORCES
It was not ordained general McKiernan...
that was establishing the martial law.
The martial law never declared itself.
We are in a process
of transition, sincerely...
there is a civil law in Iraq, but there is not...
They already heard that the first two courts
they were opened today...
so, when it is begun from zero...
With the martial law...
that the fourth Convention of Geneva
would have authorized...
perhaps there would have been more safety.  
We are a marines' section... 
we might have detained the plundering... 
if they had arranged it to us.  
The big mystery of the Iraqi postwar period... 
it is why in one month  
after the fall of Baghdad...  
NATIONAL PUBLISHER  
... the USA did not do anything...  
to control the plundering, because...  
all the problems since then...  
they began the first month.  
The Council of National Safety...  
the secretary of Powell, I and others...  
the director of the CIA, we express  
our worries for the plundering.  
speak with the president Bush?  
I was present at the meeting  
in that my chief commented on it to himself.  
What did mister Powell say?  
This is not our way of acting.  
to the president  
they are private.  
From Washington it was said...  
that we would not interfere...  
that we would not detain the plundering...  
that we would not be police officers...  
this is not what we came to do. I think...  
There were instructions  
explicit from Washington...  
not to interfere in the plundering?  
Yes.  
The plundering of Baghdad  
soon they transformed  
in a destruction of the city  
on a large scale violent and organized.  
Hospitals, governmental offices,  
universities, departments...  
The provisional authority estimated  
the losses in the plundering...  
in 12,000 million dollars.  
The same as the government debts of Iraq  
I bought a periodic today
and I remained surprised. I read eight holders who were speaking of...
"Chaos! Violence! Discomfort!".
It sounds as if it was going away to fall down the world above.
where we were seated...
and only you see cement walls,
nothing stays.
We speak about the people who comes with industrial cranes...
and it takes parts of a power plant.
Compare it with our cities...
when there have been disturbances,
problems and plundering.
!
There were no thefts in the shops.
...
to take a beam.
The images that they see in television...
there are the repeated same...
and it is the same image of someone...
with a vase.
I believe that this was the day in that we lost the Iraqis.

And you think:
Were there so many vases? ".
It is possible that there was so many vases in the whole country?
It is when it became clear... that this liberation did not have nothing to see with the Iraqis.
One believed that the EE.UU...
they incited the plundering, or that was his desire.
JOURNALIS IN BAGHDAD FROM APRIL, 2003
The destruction of our country... how could they allow it?
Be already sun or chita... the plundering was contracting you.
We did a list of 20 places... that we believed had to be protected... for history, culture, art or religion.
We send it...
but not surti no effect.
The Department of the Oil was the only one installation protected by the USA.
None was protected of the places of the list of the ORHA.
The National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad... the number one of the list of the ORHA... it was containing some of the most important objects... of the ancient civilizations.
The museum was never protected. It is a property of our nation, and the treasure of 7,000 years of civilization.
Why do they allow it?

The National Library and the National File of Iraq... that were containing thousands of manuscripts ancient they were set fire. wrote himself...
was keeping in this library.
We already have no national heritage.
Three days ago, the doctor Jabar Khalil... president of the Council of Antiquities, and I...
we went to the headquarters of the marines in the Hotel Palestine.
We wait more than four hours... until a colonel received us.
promised us that would order armored cars... to protect the remains of the museum.
This was three days ago, nobody came. To try to make responsible it is unfortunate...
activity...
in the defects of a plan of war... it looks like to me an exaggeration.
They did not receive notices of academicians between others... on the danger of the museum? There for were not asked they... to provide more safety and protection... in the initial phases of the operation?
That I know, not.
They cannot say that the plundering...  
they took them as a surprise.  
I believe that they did not want to know it.  
They did not want to hear it.  
In the months before the invasion...  
the debate on how many troops  
Iraq would be sent...  
it was supported privately...  
between the military leaders  
and Donald Rumsfeld.  
Rumsfeld and his undersecretary,  
Paul Wolfowitz...  
they believed that a force  
of less than 100,000 troops...  
it would be sufficient...  
for the invasion and occupation of Iraq.  
One month before the invasion...  
on the troops went out to the light...  
when the Chief of Staff  
of the army, Eric Shinseki...  
testified before the Committee  
with the Senate...  
ignoring the pressure  
of Rumsfeld and of Wolfowitz.  
General Shinseki...  
it can indicate us the magnitude...  
of forces of the army necessary  
for the occupation of Iraq?  
About several  
hundreds of thousands of soldiers...  
they might be necessary.  
The reaction was immediate.  
What is clear here...  
the fact is that to think that they are needed  
hundreds of thousands of soldiers...  
I believe that it leaves of the logic.  
It is inconceivable  
that need more forces...  
to stabilize Iraq  
after the fall of Saddam...  
that to carry out the proper war...  
and to assure the capitulation  
of the forces of Saddam...  
and his army. Difficult to imagine.
Difficult to imagine.
Anyone that has experience...
in the interventions in the 90s
it was known that it is precisely the opposite.
So many soldiers are needed
for every thousand inhabitants...
simply to provide
a safety minimum.
Pero Paul Wolfowitz was not imagining it.
Paul Wolfowitz refused
to be interviewed for this documentary.
...
control on
a big part of the geography...
with a class of ethnic tension...
that might cause problems...
and that's why it is needed
great presence of forces of ground.
Was general Shinseki right?
OF THE NEW ARMY OF IRAQ
His best military opinion was asked him...
and it has more experience than I.
He was a commander
of our forces in Bosnia...
it did it during more than one year...
speaks.
Secretary Powell and I...
we were fighting to order more troops...
and we obtain something, but in the end...
it was not sufficient.
Rumsfeld ended up by sending
160,000 troops to Iraq.
I believe that the war would be different...
if there was...
a leadership that it understood...
first, which is to be
in the area of the combat...
that has served in the armed forces...
and, second, which had talent of control...
to do that this works.
The tall officials...
that deprived of authority the army
...
they had no experience in
reconstruction of postwar period... 
and almost no military experience.  
Cheney avoided 
the military service in Vietnam...  
with five postponements of incorporation.  
Rumsfeld was a pilot of the marines 
in 1950, but it never fought.  
Wolfowitz and Never curl 
they had served in the army.  
Bush avoided to go to Vietnam...  
joining 
of Texas.  
Neither it had experience in politics 
exterior before being a president.  
We were looking at it and...  
that we have military experience...  
and we were commenting on it often...  
we knew that it was not well.  
In April, 2003, 
with the plundering still without controlling...  
Rumsfeld cancelled the deployment 
...  
a force of 16.000 soldiers.  
We surprised it.  
How can you cancel this division?  
If this division 
it had followed us to Iraq...  
we could have stabilized Iraq...  
with our presence only.  
On April 19, 
the ORHA entered finally Iraq...  
to begin 
the operations of postwar period.  
Of 20 departments 
that we wanted to re-use...  
16 had been destroyed...  
because of the plundering.  
We were beginning from zero.  
If there do not stay tables, chairs...  
typewriters...  
where will we receive the Iraqis 
to start working?  
Structures were not staying...  
physical or bureaucratic structures.
I had to discover the people... 
asking round there: " Do you know to ...? " 
" Do you know to anybody of Health? 
" Do you know to anybody of the Interior? 
" Do you know to anybody of Education? ". 
Inside the proper group, there was... 

We did not have lists of phones... 
we had no phone a time... 
so I suppose that these lists 
they were not so important. 
We had no information not to where to go... 
we did not know with whom contacting. 
It is not the best form... 
It is not the best form 
of beginning an occupation. 
a feeling of disorder... 
of that Iraq never recovered. 
The armed people took the control... 
they were Iraqi with weapon.

**THE GAP:**
The shootings that I the vi.th.. 
they were not American 
being irresolute... 
but Iraqis shooting Iraqis. 
You were going in car for the street and suddenly... 
it begins a wave 
of shots on your head... 
and you are in the middle of these types... 
going off some others. 
The streets were a chaos... 
anything... 
of service. 
Just before the invasion... 
Saddam had released 
to 100.000 prisoners... 
common criminals, of the jails. 
In February, 2003... 
they invited me to report 
to the advisers' panel... 
that was advising Rumsfeld... 
on matters of political of defense. 
I said to them that...
THE DIRECTOR,
CRIMINAL INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
... basing on our experience...
and in the history of Iraq...
it was very probable that
if the USA was intervening...
and it was capturing Baghdad...
we would face
to civil massive disturbances.
I suggested that we needed
...
approximately 4,000 civil police officers in the street...
of judicial advisers
and officials of prisons.
In the end, they coincided
in that it was a good idea...
but that there was no time,
perhaps for the next war.
Before the war,
the mortuary of Baghdad...
it was receiving a murder a month.
In one month, approximately 25 were coming to them a day.
Violations, sometimes for the first time...
violations and murders.
They were kidnapping Iraqi girls.
The women were disappearing...
they stopped going to the school, driving.
The Americans
they were not doing of police officers.
They did not know the streets,
they were not speaking the language...
they did not have sufficient interpreters...
they had no information
...
so it was a pitched battle...
you were feeling that there was a gap.
Very soon, the mosque filled this gap...
that EE.UU created...
on having eliminated Saddam
and not to put anything in his place.
In the quarters chitas,
soon they established the control...
especially, the clergymen
associated with Muqtada to the-Sadr.
Muqtada al-Sadr was the son of a famous clergyman and it began his ascent to the power being based on the network of his father of mosques and charity organizations. As I said, the small Satan has gone away, and the big Satan has come. of the occupation and his retreat it is the victory of Iraq and of the Iraqis. Only a few days later of that the USA will enter Baghdad... it murdered a leader pro American. It started creating an armed militia, the Army of Mahdi... that took the control of the ghetto of Baghdad... and almost all the south of Iraq. If we deal of the matters of alertness... if there had not been plundering... there would not have been sectarian militias... as safety source in the quarters. The ORHA strained in remembering the Iraqi army... that will deal with the safety. The central control of the army, CENTCOM, supported this measurement. The CENTCOM included in his plan... to re-restore the Iraqi army. They used it to seal the borders... to contribute static safety... and to help to reconstruct your own nation. But on April 23, 2003, Jay Garner received a call. Rumsfeld called me and said... " They are doing a big work. " I am glad that they are in Baghdad, certainly... " the president it has named Jerry Bremer... " presidential envoy ". 
MANAGER,
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
Bremer was
diplomatic official.
As other officials...
Bremer was not speaking Arabic...
it had no experience in the Middle East...
or in reconstruction of postwar period...
and it had never served in the army.
After the arrival of Bremer,
progressively...
and the Authority
Provisional of the Coalition, the CPA...
it would take his place.
We want to do a delivery
very effective and efficient...
BREMER COMES TO BAGHDAD
... and organized well.
General Garner and I we are...

It has done a big work.
We inform it about everything...
one day passed seeing
what was each one doing...
and, then, it took the control.
I returned to house 3, 4 or on June 5.
THE REBELLION OF BREMER
Between May 1 and May 10,
when it went out towards Iraq...
Bremer was employed at the Pentagon...
met often
with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz...
and the undersecretary Doug Feith.
Bremer also worked
with Walter Slocombe...
undersecretary of Defense...
whom Rumsfeld entrusted
the politics of postwar period...
for the Iraqi army.
They called me in the middle of May, 2003.
thought in some moment...
what was a little late to think about that?
ADVISER FOR DEFENSE
AND NATIONAL SAFETY
Yes.
Was it said to them?
Not.
As Bremer...
Slocombe had not served in the army...
it had not gone to Iraq...
it had no experience
in reconstruction of postwar period...
was not speaking Arabic.
In the first 10 days
of work of Bremer...
in Washington...
it took three fatidical decisions.
the formation...
of a provisional Iraqi government...
although Jay Garner
it had worked to establish it.
Jay Garner was in favor...
of forming an Iraqi government...
but Baghdad was suppressed of way...
and I do not believe that
general Garner knew it...
not I neither.
might say
that promised us...
that there would be a sovereign government...
almost immediately.
" I am in charge and all
they will obey me. That is quite.
" Understood? ".
This way it was like...
L. Paul Bremer It appeared.
Too loyal and too much
dependent on his mission...
to notice that his prompt exclusion
of the Iraqis...
of the process of capture of decisions...
it was a catastrophic error.
refused
to be interviewed for this documentary.
In May, 2003 we had
the legal occupation of Iraq.
In that moment I said it, and now I believe...
that was an error.
We want that EE.UU... leave Iraq completely... and that allow to the Iraqi people to govern Iraq. The reaction against his following decisions... it would be worse enough. Desbaazificacin. I restore today an Iraqi commission for the desbaazificacin... so that the structure and the influence... of the party Baaz they are eliminated forever. His second decision... his first formal order at the head of the CPA... it eliminated approximately 50,000 members of the party Baaz... that Saddam had used to govern Iraq. For the majority, the order of Bremer supposed the permanent unemployment. Also it paralyzed the Iraqi government... the educational system and the economy... on having eliminated expert officials... that joined the party... only to survive of Saddam. Ambassadress Robin Raphel...

said to me:
? ".
" Desbaazificacin ". I read it superficially and said...
" I believe that we will not be able to do it ".

said:
We went to see it and I said...
" Allow us to deal...
" to call Rumsfeld...
" to smooth it ".

He said:
" I have orders that to fulfill ". The discussion was finished.
was coming to speak with me
in some moment...
I do not remember it, really that not.
does not remember that these people were saying...
- " are they from 30 to 50,000 persons "?
- It can that yes.
" What do you do? "
I alone...
It was working 20 hours a day
at that time.
It was not the only thing that it had to do...
in my first five days to the charge.
Bremer named Ahmed Chalabi...
chief of the commission of desbaazificacin.
Chalabi centred
in political rivals eliminate.
The desbaazificacin was so deep...
that we could not
to start the government...
in an effective way...
not with rapidity...
and there were many baazistas
without right to vote.
For what do we ask?
I work! I work!
...
although they were only professionals...
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY

ADVISER OF BUSH:
... engineers, the directors.
The technocrats, the intelligence...
the librarians of school.
...
to have no means
to support your family...
it was a very humiliating experience.
But it was the third decision...
the one that it exploited in the hands.
To dissolve the Iraqi army
and the services of intelligence...
the most important institutions of Iraq.
The second order the CPA...
the Iraqi army dissolved,
and the secret police.
From the day until the morning, Bremer desemple...
and it angered to half a million
of armed men...
to more than five millions...
in the United States.
the rebellion, these men...
they created one.

DECLARATIONS:
IRAQI SOLDIERS.
I do not believe that they should do that.
Hundreds of thousands of families
they were depending on the army.
They had no income, had no providers.
We are hungry, there is no bread,
meal, money, we want to work.
Children, women, wives,
sisters, parents...
they stopped eating because
there was no sufficient money.
The official number of unemployment is 27 %.
I am sure that it is much more.
would say that between 40 % and 50 %.
that these people...
of that almost they had all
military training...
since the military service
it is obligatory in Iraq...
or they were active military men...
they were joining the rebellion...
of feeding his families...
something of pride.
After the Iraqi army dissolves...
Bremer was undoing a measurement...
supported so much by the army
for the ORHA.
...
that was looking for the Iraqi army...
was finding many soldiers...
had already found many people...
because we wanted reinstaurarlo.
On having enlisted,
the soldiers had to sign...
or to refill a questionnaire...
on whom were they,
were they, what they were doing...
what skills did they have...
what did military man equip did they have in house...
a lot of information...
that us would have been useful to us.
I was assembling all that.
of advisers of Defense...
that it had to treat
with the Iraqi soldiers...
in charge of Walter Slocombe...
it had remained in Washington
had not visited Iraq.

I said:
" I can prepare oneself better in Washington ".
I asked them repeatedly...
was speaking with them from Baghdad...
that had to come...
because there were the people waiting for them...
and, in particular, to a man...
so that it was taking decisions
and it was starting it.
In his absence, they left to me the task...
of treating with the Iraqi army...
only to support the contact.
The Iraqi army was planted there...
waiting for an approach...
...
that someone was coming...
was saying to them: " East is the plan,
and you are essential.
" We need them ".
Nobody did it ever.
On having finished the war...
on having finished the principal attacks...
units were already not staying
that will work...
they all had gone away to house.
The generals were returning...
with finished divisions saying:
" These are mine ".
One of the Iraqi officials...

... said...

" Colonel Paul,
I have 10,000 military police officers...
" at your disposal
in one week if you need them ".
I transmitted it to the people of Bernie Kerik...
but they did not do anything.
the dissolution of the army.
Five days after this order...
Jay Garner...
because it was going to leave Iraq
forever on the following day.
We were going in two vehicles in the highway...
going out of the Green space...
when the emboscaron
and they killed two soldiers.
In my opinion, that one was
the beginning of the rebellion.
We go, go, go!
We go, go, go!
My companions and I
we were sitting down in the balcony...
or in the roof
of the Palace of the Republic at night...
and we saw the trackers
for the whole Baghdad.
We saw the flares
of different colors to rise...
indicating adnde they were going...
the convoys of the USA.
of certain compositions...
them.
Iraq was possessing 10 big deposits of weapon
and many more stores
of ammunition without watching.
There were no sufficient soldiers
of the USA to watch them.
They knew where the ammunition was...
they knew how to come
to the weapon and how to use them...

and:
what do they go away because they do not exist?
would not recommend the common sense to you.
There were enormous stores of ammunition...
without watching for weeks...
or even some months later
of finishing the principal combats.
You see how the insurgents...
they extract missiles, mortars and bombs...
of these stored consignments
for the Iraqis...
and hidden in some place.
say to the Britons
or to those of the USA, who is...
with your small receiver GPS...
" Boys...
" we have found 18,000 millions
of tons of bombs...
" and there is a group of Iraqis with AK-47 s...
" taking them.
" I do not believe that it is the best idea.
They are here ".
And they were saying to you...
" There are no sufficient people to cover it ".
One could not believe it,
it was not the correct response.
See and deal for your own safety...
for that of the citizens, for all...
it is a bad idea.
warned
that to dissolve the army like that...
it would impel, and in fact it impelled,
the massive growth of the rebellion?
Certainly not in these terms.
Did nobody say it to himself?
Not. I do not believe that it is true...
but nobody said it, nobody said...
believe that it is true?
Not, I do not believe that it is true.
Generals' quantity of high status...
they came to the headquarters
of the UNO in the Hotel Channel...
and they were very clear
on the consequences...
this order...
and of alienating...
to this powerful segment of the society...
that would finish in rebellion.
A Lebanese diplomat
called Hassan Salami...
said to his companion when
the generals went away...
...
"I see bullets in his eyes.
"I see bullets in his eyes".

Even more surprising
that the decision to dissolve the army...
it was the form in which this decision was taken...

Secretly, in one week...
for a group of men in Washington
that had never gone to Iraq.

They did not consult it
with the commanders in Iraq...
not with the chiefs
of staff sets...
not with the ORHA,
...

not with the CIA
not even the Council of National Safety...
not even, as it seems,
with the president of the USA.

We interviewed again
to Walter Slocombe and to Paul Hughes...
...
that led to the dissolution of the army.
They were called to yes same.

was already counting
with 100,000 persons on May 9...
Did they already have 100,000?
Yes, it was a national effort.
wanted all the copies...
all the discs, and they gave them to me...
and I took them to him to the ORHA.

I said to them:
...
"I have all this waiting for you".

Hughes was thinking about being in contact
with Iraqi officials...
that would have been ready
to re-constitute the units.
It had already obtained 137.000
of conscription.
Not. It had not done it. It is possible that it had...
Nobody might have obtained
of 130.000 not at all...
for nothing, in the chaos
that was reigning in this moment.
They had a system of courier service...
that was covering the area
metropolitan of Baghdad...
of Mosul, of Basora and of Kirkuk.
I do not understand...
Considering the difficulty
to do any thing...
in the ambience
of the operations and the organization...
nobody had 137.000.
Walt was not there.
never met with them,
it did not have it nor designs.
say to Slocombe what happened?
.
You had already done him...
a recommendation
to ambassador Bremer...
and I had done
a try of recommendation...
to secretary Rumsfeld...
on the dissolution of the army...
On the emission of the order
, yes.
Yes, on May 9.
- Yes.
- Very well.
May 9 was the last time
that I had a conversation...
with Walt Slocombe.
We speak by phone
before I was going away.
said to him...
" We are thinking
in the army dissolves...
your efforts to reform it "?
One of the things that I did...
say it to himself ever?
With these words, not.
The conversation was: " I go for there.
" It worries me where I am going to live.
" Will I have vehicles at my disposal?
" My own cooks? ". Bla, bla, bla.
It was not a question of the Iraqi army.
I was informing him on the matter...
did not say that there was already...
come to the conclusion...

and it had recommended
to Bremer the dissolution of the army?
Insurance that not, because in this case...
would have been going to see Jay immediately.
This idea occurred to them...
and it was recommended to Rumsfeld...
without speaking with anybody in Iraq
that was responsible...
of these matters?
It was hanging,
and, precisely, due to...
that only had been thought
for some days...
because Bremer was going away to Iraq
said to Rumsfeld...
" Before doing a recommendation,
I will speak with the people there ".
Bremer came to Baghdad on May 12.
His consultations with the people
in ground they were brief or nonexistent.
surprise it?
Had they commented on it to themselves?
Not, nobody said anything to me...
it was a big surprise.
- Seriously?
- Aha.
It never called Garner and said:
" We want to do this...
" does it look like to you a good idea? ".
I believe that not.
believe that this was an error?
Not. 
think?  
It looked like to me awful idea.  
I believed that it was necessary to do the opposite.  
The commanders of the army also  
they were opposed to the decision of Bremer.  
John Abizaid and Dave McKiernan  
they were saying to me constantly...  
" Do we worry?  
" Let's reform the army ".  

... 
Iraqi soldiers  
.  
Not only it is worrying  
for the safety...  
but for the economy.  
They already do not have a salary.  
promises to be...  
that the Iraqi army has been dissolved,  
I remained without words.  
In this epoch,  
... 
had not come to Iraq.  
Colonel Hughes was the manager...  
of treating with the Iraqi army...  
because nobody  
of his group of advice...  
it had gone still to Iraq, included you.  
did not think that it should  
to have spoken with I on this matter?  
- I spoke with I very much.  
- It is curious.  
says that the order to dissolve the army...  
it was an entire surprise for I...  
and that found out  
for television in the airport.  
That is... If that is like that...  
I surprise it, but it is impossible.  

...  
Or, I spoke...  
I...  
We work together every day  
while I was there.  
- May 16 came.
On May 16?
For a brief visit
of four days for the country.
Ah.
Then one went and did not return
until middle of June.

- Seriously?
- This way it is.
comment on it to himself?
Jay Garner and Paul Hughes were not
the only ones surprised by the order.
The idea of dissolving the whole army...
it took me as a surprise.
I see already.
Was CuI his reaction?
I thought that we had created a problem.
There were many unemployed soldiers.
The president had another idea...
that was to support assets
status.
- Earlier, yes.
- Yes.
Concerning a few days.
To the majority we surprised it a little...
or completely the dissolution of the army.
Secretary Powell knew it just as I.
How?
We find out the day...
that Jerry announced the dissolution.
- And Condoleezza Rice?
- That she speaks for yes same.
Condoleezza Rice refused
to be interviewed for this documentary.
How much did the president know...
on these decisions in advance?
I said already before s if Rumsfeld
had informed him or not.
It does not even design.
I was only two hours in the office...
a young military police officer came and said...
" Colonel Hughes,
there are some Iraqi officials...
" that want to speak with you ".
I was saying to myself: " Go for God.
"What am I going to say to them?"
In the end I decided to go down...
and to meet with them
in the Palace of the Republic.

"I do not have it nor designs
from how has this arisen."

Said to me:

"Money does not come already to them.
"What are they going to do now?"

Moan, carajo.

In July, 2003, the insurgents begin
to put explosives for the whole Iraq.
There is a big increase
of the soldiers of the USA.
How many times have I said it to you?
- Shit!
- Carajo!

Moan, my ear!
It is necessary to leave from here.
Some of them believe...
that the possibility exists
of that they attack us.

My response is that they dare.
I was going in the bucket.
The bucket is a vehicle
that is not armored.
, it is going to reach you.

Nobody wants to go there.
In 2003, only 1 of every 8 vehicles in Iraq.

The explosion gave to me almost directly.
Then, I went out...
I started hearing shootings...
that were approaching ... bang, bang.

We start shooting.
We have a small problem
with some resistance...

... that use military professional tactics...
to attack and to kill our soldiers,
as on the same morning.
- Not...
does not believe...
what is a coordinated campaign?
- Not, not...
- That is guerrillas...
in the phase of guerrilla war?
Because of this explosion...
I suffered an injury
cerebral traumatic sharp...
and I lost the perception
of the light in the right eye.
I suffered damages in the left eye...
that they caused
a hole to blacken in the retina...
but we fight, fight
up to the high place to the fire.
I was a gunner. My driver
it lost two legs...
and I went out flying of the car...
and I suffered a break of femur,
almost I lose the right arm...
me colaps a lung
and I had internal wounds in the head.
Since then,
I have looked in the dictionary...
some things, of which
I do not remember very much...
but one was a " guerrilla war "...
the different one was a " rebellion ", another age...
slightly conventional " war ". Pardon?
Impasse?
Not, of that another person takes charge...
I do not do these things.
I meet an expert
in counter-insurgency.
It was in the palace where
the CPA has his headquarters...
was speaking with a colonel of the army...
that was sitting down nearby
of the office of Bremer.
The word " rebellion " and the colonel used...
it raised the hand and said:
" In Iraq there is no rebellion. 
"There is a high level of popular violence ". The safety problem...
progressively it prevented us
to realize our work.
would have wanted to establish commissions
of advice in the quarters.
Three general managers...
ty they gave perhaps the presentation
more coherent on the structure...
and the organization
of a city of 1500 years...
.
One of them got overturned in a plan...
for the groups of advice.
It had designed a local democratization
.
It was a beautiful plan.

And:
It was murdered.
The country descontrolaba more and more...
all the time,
and I believe that, somehow...
Bremer and his assistants did not know...
the bad thing on that the things were putting themselves
beyond the walls of containment.
THE PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
OF THE COALITION
one
Palace of the Republic of Saddam...
the enclosure of the CPA,
called the Green space...
it was protected by 12 km from walls.
There were enormous lines of Iraqis,
gineers, officials...
JOURNALIS IN BAGHDAD FROM APRIL, 2003
They wanted to help, to translate...
In line on the verge of the palace...
they were making them wait and nobody was receiving them.
They were saying to them that they should and were doing not returning.
one, two...
three times and it is already.
hated the Green space.
It was going out whenever it could
to meet with the Iraqis...
to go to his hearths and to listen to his complaints...
and his opinions.
was saying to Dan Senor...
" They have a problem,
they do not speak with the Iraqis ".
Dan Senor, the spokesman
does not speak Arabic.
Almost no high control
was speaking Arabic.
...
between the 40, 50
70 more important officials.
We had regional experts
that had served in Iraq.
...
they did not take part in the initial phase...
after the invasion of Iraq
and the initial occupation...
so this skill got lost.
How did it finish his stage there.
- Mm...
- I understand...
that is a difficult topic.
should want.
Mm...
would say that it ended
was thinking...
and very much earlier
of what I had wanted.
I had liked being...
and to try to give everything...
Considering the frustrations and the limitations...
much was deserving
to be in this place...
and to try to do what we wanted to do.
her?
I know why. They said it to me.
Why?
It was difficult to treat...
and it was giving opinions...
that were going against the current
of the epoch in Baghdad.
Since Bremer appeared,
the new people were coming to us.
Newly adjusted as the school: do you know?
They had the secondary one...
from the autumn ... the previous spring.
Papi did a contribution to the campaign...
and the child has the opportunity to come...
and to live through a full trip
of diversion and adventure.
Dad's children, this way I was calling them...
and they were sitting down opposite to the door of Bremer
and they were not doing anything.
In my stay...
MANAGER OF ONG AND PROFESSOR
... in the Green space...
I met one of my students...
newly graduated.
said to me...
radiant of happiness...
" They have asked me to do...
" the plan of traffic for the city ".
I asked him if it was known something
of municipal planning...
said to me that not.
Newly gone out of the school...
and supervised by something quite complicated...
to say the least, and
seeing the traffic of Baghdad...
the need is obvious.
Almost all the officials
they had contracts of three months.
As soon as they were creating...
the suitable relations
with the Iraqis...
in 90 days, 100 days, 120 days,
they were going away to house...
and there is nothing worse than that
to direct an organization.
There was a preference...
SPECIALIST IN BUDGE CATEDRTICA
... much egg white of the Pentagon...
for that the companies
of the USA they were doing the work.
There were numerous cases
in that Iraqi contractors...
they proposed to do the same work...  
for much less money...  
that the contractors of the USA.  
Ann and I had a different approach...  
to that of many units of the coalition...  
because we work  
with the Iraqis.  
;  
it was with Americans...  
THE FIRST LIEUTENANT, MARINATES  
... and Iraqis, and the Iraqis  
they had the same voice as we.  
We were constructing our fortresses...  
those of the army...  
that was using a big contractor  
of the USA, Parsons.  
We were designing and constructing  
our fortresses...  
in approximately five months.  
On having gone away, the fortresses of Parsons...  
begun  
one year before we come...  
they were still not finished.  
The fortresses of Seth Moulton  
and Ann Gildroy they cost 200.000 dollars.  
Those of Parsons cost  
1200 million dollars.  
The officials of the army  
often they were going out to the street...  
to spend the small quantity  
of funds that they had...  
for immediate action in,  
let's say, to clean the streets...  
to realize temporary progress  
in the drainage system...  
On having been finished...  
this small quantity of money in that...  
everything was relapsing into the CPA.  
" We need this and this...  
" for these projects, and it will cost so much ".  
It was disappearing, simply it was disappearing.  
" And my request? "  
" What request? "  
That was not stopping recurring.
for the reconstruction in October, 2003.
18.000 million dollars
that the Congress promised...
they were misinterpreted and were wasted...
if it went so far as to spend.
We will produce sufficient electricity...
so that in the whole Iraq there is...
service 24 hours of the day...
essential for his hopes of future.
There was fraud, corruption and squandering.
One year later, only 1.000 million
of dollars they had been invested in Iraq.
The normal people obtain electricity...
only two or three hours a day.
The water comes occasionally,
every two or three days.
the winter trembling,
wrapped in blankets...
because we have no fuel
for the heaters.
This way it is our life.
In May, 2003...
the United Nations
sent his best expert...
in reconstruction of postwar period
to help in the occupation of the USA.
He was a Brazilian diplomat
so-called Sergio Vieira de Mello.
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNO
Although they were not leaving that the UNO
it was making nothing important...

Kofi Annan said:
" If someone can leave well the UNO...
" this is Sergio Vieira de Mello ".
, I was his...
SPECIAL ADVISER OF THE UNO
... political principal adviser...
and we were together to Baghdad.
was speaking Arabic...
and it had experience working
in the region and others.
One of the best things
that Sergio did...
with hindsight the fact was that...
on having seen that the USA had shut itself up...
in the Green space
and it was not going out to the streets of Iraq...
Sergio created a structure in Iraq...
that was the opposite to the Green space.
Call it the Green Antiarea.
I hear the political leaders...
to say that we will meet every day.
We discuss often with the soldiers...
that were coming to the UNO to speak
with Sergio Vieira de Mello...
and they were asking him to come up...
that the CPA was supporting with.
You saw long lines
on the outside of the Green space...
but nobody heard his complaints.
On the contrary, the enclosure of the UNO
it was completely an open sea.
If you wanted to complain, the UNO
it was more than arranged...
to listen to you,
his mission...
these complaints to Bremer,
to the highest thing...
with the hope that they were doing something...
before the rebellion was becoming strong.
I meet with I often...
and my experience.
As soon as Bremer obtained
wanted of Sergio...
of the UNO...
it already did not have any more time
for the United Nations.
Through what Sergio lived...
there were two months
of being used, literally...
to come to certain segments
of the Iraqi society...
and, in his last month...
had to support
they neither that nor him were answering the phone.
political of detention...
to hood the prisoners,
there were topics that Sergio...
it was treating repeatedly with Bremer
and with general Snchez...
but Bremer was not interested in.
Three or four crucial months
after the fall of Baghdad...
two principal things
that the soldiers of the USA were doing, were...
to look for weapon of massive destruction
and to Saddam Hussein.
The process of these searches...
doors below in the night...
imintimidating the people,
taking them to Abu Ghraib...
doing detentions in mass,
it had a bitter effect.
We go! Forward!
We go! We go!
If you were Iraqi in military age...
in an area of operations
of the army of EE.UU...
it was very probable that they were arresting you...
possible insurgent.
Only for being a man
in military age in the area of operations.
In many occasions, on having removed...
to the Iraqi in military age of his family...
you take to the head of the family.
I have not anybody left,
I swear it for the life of Mahoma
it has not made bad at all.
Moan, my son, Amer!
Not only you anger to I,
but to all his family...
because it is possible that not only it supports
to his most nearby family.
When they heard the helicopters of EE.UU...
or the tanks of the USA for the streets...
they were getting up immediately...
although it was going to two o'clock in the morning...
and they were prepared for the detention.
Because for them,
even now, it is the normal thing.
There were attacks on
the proper American soldiers...
and they were answering to these attacks...
going out to look for the insurgents...
and on having tried to do that...
sometimes, they were arresting
to the wrong persons.
Even, sometimes, they were killing
to the wrong person.
After arresting someone,
they were tending to disappear...
in the prison military system of EE.UU...
during a lot of time without track.
His families did not know anything.
The army of the USA does not reveal...
the number of brave Iraqis
or arrested in Iraq from 2003.
It is difficult to understand
being.
They aim at you from the vehicles.
the car.
The Iraqis were not understanding
the instructions...
that were giving to them in the positions of control.
If they were approaching very rapidly, they were killing them.
Almost all the units
of the USA with that I was...
they were straining very much
in doing the correct thing...
and not to kill or to hurt nobody...
that did not want
or they will need to kill or to hurt.
But there is no doubt
of that the wars are chaotic...
and, this one in Iraq...
at this level of rebellion...
it is even worse.
One after other one, they were taking
decisions in the short term...
that, at the end of 2003...
they proved in a country
with an increasing rebellion.
HEAD OFFICE OF THE UNO IN BAGHDAD
ON AUGUST 19, 2003
On August 19, 2003,
an enormous bomb destroyed
the head office of the UNO in Baghdad
murdering 22 persons.
Between the dead persons,
the special envoy of the UNO in Iraq,
Sergio Vieira de Mello.
A truck done in Russia...
parked opposite to the window
of Sergio Vieira de Mello...
and the enormous one detonated
quantity of explosives.
The whole corner south-west
of the UNO it collapsed.
Sergio was still alive under the debris...
more than three hours
hoping that they should rescue it.
We lost many companions this day...
and I believe that it was the sign
of that slightly drastic...
it had happened in the country and of that
the rebellion had turned...
in very lethal and organized...
ready for a long struggle...
against the forces of the coalition.
In 2004, the relation between the army...
it had become untenable.
Here it are where to these mierditas...
stones to us.
Curse!
There you have it!
But we cannot use mortal force.
We cannot use mortal force.
Lump it!
Lump it you, mierdita!
that are going to work...
for the private contractors...
that take charge of big part
of the reconstruction...
because we do not have sufficient troops.
There are more than 45.000 contractors
deprived of the army in Iraq,
more than in no other war of the USA.
PARLIAMENTARIAN IRAQU
They have special custodies.
I do not know who are... they have permission to shoot to the people, as well as this way. I have seen multitude of civil contractors... especially violent... and with few vision on what they do. is a home-loving video of a private military contractor in Iraq. The music belongs to the original. Saddam hurt us very much, it is true. It is something that does not forget. But what has come it is worse than Saddam. When a problem like that is created, it is necessary to arrange it or to go away. They should not leave it this way. Arrange it or out. In any moment, when it has an opportunity... I will face to the United States. With weapon? Of any form, with or without weapon. Did it already face them? Perhaps. At the beginning of 2004, Faluya... a city of 350.000 inhabitants to the west of Baghdad... it had turned into the center of the rebellion sun. On March 31, 2004... four military contractors of the USA they were murdered... and his bodies were dragged by the streets... for victorious multitudes. At the beginning of 2004... the Council of National Intelligence... a powerful committee of 12 persons... placed at the head of the community of intelligence of EE.UU... it realized several evaluations of the increasing rebellion... to the White House... and to tall officials of the government.
We register
the growth of the rebellion.
It was growing and was not limiting itself
to foreign combatants...
or to baazistas coldness.
What we call a rebellion...
it is a deep-rooted fact
of multiple facets.
OFFICIAL OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
FOR THE MIDDLE EAS Not only some rebels baazistas...
not only a few foreign extremists...
but rather it was reflecting
multiple motivations...
and frustrations...
between the proper Iraqis.
situation deteriorates...
on having weakened
...
and after the resentment grows
against the occupation of the USA.
The CIA...
it raised...
several cases...
in that the life
it could be the awful, normal...
and better.
The president had not read it...
not even the summary of a page
that so much cost us...
because we limited everything to only one page.
Did the president read not even the summary?
This way it is.
They only...
they were imagining the conditions.
How many people in Iraq estimate you...
ADVISER OF THE CPA FOR IRAQ
... what have they taken part in the rebellion?
At any level, if it is alone supporting...
providing secret storages...
possibly more than 100,000 persons.
Mosul, Iraq. On December 9, 2004
Two cars entered
in the district of Yarmouk.
There were Americans inside.
They all died, all.
In spite of the intensification
of the rebellion...
there were still no sufficient ones
armored cars...
for the soldiers of the USA in Iraq.
We had not even an armored car...
while we were in Iraq in 2003.
We went to Iraq in 2004...
...
in Kuwait...
that were like pieces
in the shape of doors without windows...
and a moon to test of bullets, that was quite.
If his vehicle
it had not been armored...
cuI believes that it would have been
the damage of the explosive?
I believe that it would have been mortal.
For what us do we have
that to poke in dumps...
looking for metal pieces...
and armored glazing
to reinforce our cars?
...
for us?
...
not of money.
It is not a question,
on the part of the army, desire...
it is a question
of production and aptitude to achieve it.
There are factories of cars
that close in the USA.
I am not an expert in factories...
but reutilizarlas
to produce armored cars...
it should not be difficult.
You go to the war with the army that you have...
and the one that you would like to have,
or you would wish later.
THE THINGS CRUMBLE
In November, 2004,
the Pentagon decided to attack Faluya...
to recover the city
of the rebellion sun.
350,000 citizens were warned
of Faluya that were leaving the city.
The battle destroyed 70 % of the city...
leaving 150,000 homeless.
In spite of the intense combats,
many insurgents escape.
40 marines turn out to be dead.
While the army of the USA.
it was worrying about Faluya...
the militias chitas
they were taking possession of the south of Iraq.
There is neither an army nor a multitude...
of hundreds of persons...
trying to demolish or to change the situation.
In August, 2004...
the holy city of Nayaf
it is controlled by the Army of Mahdi...
the militia chita led
for Muqtada to the-Sadr.
Seth's section faced
to the militia of Muqtada to the-Sadr.
...
that we substitute it was...
that almost quite in Nayaf was very pacific.
Except 3,000 men of the militia...
that occupy the center of the city.
The bullets were flying, the mortars were falling down.
My section was the first one.
We take positions
with the police of Iraq...
and we defended her from the militia.
But until ends of August...
we did not do a large-scale assault...
city of Nayaf
and we recover her.
To Muqtada to the-Sadr
was allowed to escape unharmed.
If the democracy
it does not help the Iraqi people...
the people will say:
"To the devil with the democracy."
"We need a strong man ".
And I see that this man is on having fallen down...
and the name of to the-Sadr is Muqtada.
I believe that it is not the best election
as future leader of Iraq.
It took part in the deliberations...
on if capturing
or to kill Muqtada to the-Sadr?
Yes, this way it is.
We were considering it a troublemaker...
and a source of problems?
Certainly, we wanted to arrest it.
Everything turns concerning the matter
of the force of the troops.
The army did not have to relax...
of his principal mission...
to begin what would have been
a battle cuts...
although difficult, and surely bloody...
and this is what was decided in the end.
After the elections in Iraq,
on December 15, 2005...
Alliance...
with the party of Muqtada to the-Sadr
as principal participant...
it occupied almost the half of the benches
in the central government of Iraq.
It is not easy for a marine that someone...
and his militia murdered
to some of my friends...
and to see it rising in the politics of Iraq...
it is frustrating.
Another group chita
of the alliance of Sadr it is SCIRI...
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
The leaders of the SCIRI
they lived through 20 years in Iran...
and they are, often, pro Iranian.
These groups chitas...
that sometimes fight against them themselves...
they are allied politically
against the groups sunes.
The Army of Mahdi de Muqtada to the-Sadr...
it continues the clashes
with the forces of the USA.
The level of activity that is seen today...
from a point
of military sight it will diminish.
I believe that it is the last breath
of the rebellion, if they allow it to me.
When secretary Rumsfeld
and the vice-president Cheney...
they commented that the rebellion
it was drooping...
that were alone a few rebels...
you knew that the estimation
of the intelligence...
was it already indicating that they were wrong?
It had gone to Iraq eight times...
knew the facts on the area.
They will have to speak and judged...
for his words and actions...
but I knew what the facts were.
Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld
they refused to be interviewed.
At the beginning of 2005,
the administration began little by little...
to correct some of his errors.
It accelerated the training
of the Iraqi army...
and it named a Moslem diplomat...
Zalmay Khalilzad, like ambassador.
In June, 2006...
amassador Khalilzad sent
a cable with bad predictions...
to Condoleezza Rice.
The Iraqis of the embassy...
they were not saying to his families
where were they working...
for fear of being murdered.
if the Americans were going away.
were preparing themselves
for your own sequestrations.
Six months later...
the day after the republicans
they were losing the control of the Congress...
the president Bush announces
the resignation of Rumsfeld.
The new secretary of Defense, Robert Gates...
he is a pragmatist that
has criticized the war privately.
I do changes
in the secretariat of Defense...
to give a new perspective
on how obtaining anything...
that almost we all wish, victory.

THE CHAOS:
When Rumsfeld is replaced...
Iraq is out of control.
The country is every time
more dominated by militias...
insurgents, criminals and commanders.
The mixed areas are purged
in ethnic purges.
The militias chitas
they have infiltrated into the police...
using them for sectarian slaughters.
The sequestrations and the violent deaths...
they come to several hundreds per day.
They kidnapped them on the market...
and they executed them.
They executed them for being sunes.
There are many types of militia.
The militia of Mahdi...
MINISTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ
... the militia of Badr...
there are many militias in this country.
They all are very democratic...
to arrest and to kill the people.
The safety is the awful
in many quarters...
with the permanent threat
of cars bomb and home-loving explosives.
A car bomb exploited just there.
I was here, my father here
and my brother there.
The explosion killed my brother.
.
Cars bomb,
home-loving explosives, sequestrations...
There are a lot of ways of dying.

They kidnapped a child opposite to the hotel...
a car stopped, seized the child and went away.
They ask the parents for a rescue...
that they will have to obtain in one week.
A few sequestrations are not alone,
they are hundred of them...

ADVISER OF SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR DE IRAQ
... and it is overwhelming.

Where did they kidnap them?
They took them of his shops,
to the four.

We went to the office of Sadr
to ask him and to request him...
but they said that they were not they.

There is a persons' avalanche...
asking for help or...
or that soon stop asking for help.

Why to denounce the police?
One, we do not trust in them.
Two, perhaps they commit the crimes.

His uniforms were proliferating
for all places.

There are many elements of looting...
for safety services.

They arrest the people due to many sources.
Do not know who are.

False positions of control
the people...

to verify his identity
and to see if they are chitas...
, and then...
they kidnap them or kill them there same.

When I say goodbye of my husband...
I always believe that I will not return.

At the end of 2006,
Baghdad was a lawlessness.
The army of the USA.
it was controlling the Green space...
and the area of the airport of Baghdad.
The safety forces of Iraq
they were controlling the East and the south.
The militias sunes were controlling...
several quarters sues important.
The Army of Mahdi de Muqtada to the-Sadr
it was dominating extensive areas...
including the enormous district chita
of the city of Sadr.
The militia chita rival of the SCIRI,
the Brigade Badr...
it was controlling the areas chitas rich.
The organizations of quarter
they were controlling many small areas.
Extensive areas were remaining without controlling.

CONSEQUENCES:
Of a realized study...
for the catedrtica
of Harvard Linda Bilmas...
and the winner of a nobel Joseph Stiglitz...
at the beginning of 2007, the USA there was
spent 379.000 million dollars...
directly in the war of Iraq.
The future operations are estimated
in approximately 389.000 million dollars.
The cost of the care to the veterans...
and the loss of productiveness
as that they serve in Iraq...
it costs 482.000 million dollars.
The cost of the demobilization
of the army...
that is finished six times
more rapidly of the normal thing...
it is 160.000 million dollars.
The increase of the price
of the oil due to the war...
it has cost to the USA.
450.000 million dollars.
cost of the war...
it is believed that it will reach
1,8 trillions of dollars.
I suffer...
migraines postraumticas...
and epilepsy postraumtica.
Sometimes, I have bad memories
of what it happened...
but I do not scare them.
emotionally well?
Sometimes, it is a little...
Sometimes, yes. Sometimes, not.
difficult meeting to treat with...
you know already...
what us happened to me
and to my partner. Sometimes.
The big cost concerned
to the disability of the veterans...
it is for these hundreds
of thousands of persons...
that they return and see
that cannot work...
earlier...
because there are no same that earlier.
What temperatures are reached here?
Yesterday we come to 48 grades.
- 48 grades?
- Yes.
The last contract
that signed with the government.
Many of the units go...
three periods of service...
and some of them do not see that the end approaches.
They believe that they will return for his fifth one...
the sixth, seventh period of service
before it finishes.
We do not have enough troops.
How us protegeremos
before a possible conflict in Pyongyang...
NORTH KOREA ANNOUNCES

NUCLEAR TESTS:
... a possible conflict with Iran...
other possible conflicts in the world...
if we have it quite overturned...
towards Iraq and Afghanistan?
It is curious, but Iran...
ASSISTANT OF THE SECRETARY
OF CLINTON'S DEFENSE
... in spite of our hate
...
he is the biggest beneficiary
of the war of Iraq.
We eliminate his enemy
historical for them...
and we put them to the head
of the War of the Gulf.
When you attend a civil war like that...
vViolent and disagreeable...
on 20 %
of the world supply of oil...
that it will affect with safety
to nearby countries...
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Syria, perhaps up to Egypt.
If Iraq disintegrates and turns
in a field of civil war...
it will look alike increasingly
to a small Afghanistan.
It are where they will shelter
.
If Iraq returns to
islamofascista...
that of the talibanes in Afghanistan...
we will have returned
on September 10, 2001...
only that to major scale...
and with thousands of million dollars
of oil at his disposal.
On having begun the reconstruction...
we were joking...
with that there were 500 ways of harming it...
and two or three of it to do well...
and what we did not understand...
the fact is that we were going to try
these 500 forms first.
Why were these errors committed?
I do not know it.
I do not have it nor designs. It is disconcerting.
The president Bush
it disappeared in combat...
in the planning of the postwar period.
It delegated in his vice-president
and in his secretary of Defense...
the control of these decisions.
Why, if he was the president of EE.UU...
it would use the military force
then to feign ignorance...
of, essentially,
the most important aspect...
period?
Who was in charge in this war?
I do not want to repeat the whole list.
The president, the vice-president...
the secretary of Defense...
those who were surrounding them.
The Assessor of National Safety?
Skylight.
The vice-president?
Yes.
...
that was planning everything that thing about the war.
My error was not to try to take part any more...
in the process of planning.
I see already.
So that the dissolution of the army...
had not it been a surprise?
It might have fought a heap...
.
It would have lost, but it would have gone.
The system should be participativo...
and to include the people
that is ready to say...
" This has no sense, mister president.
" It is a bad idea ".
I do not believe that these processes
of capture of decisions...
they existed in the administration of Bush.
I was not sorry that I was taking part...
in no process of capture of decisions.
The administration never asked...
no opinion poll of the population
on Iraq before the war.
Nobody was interested in
what the community will think?
I believe that it was already quite determined...
from the beginning.
Any analysis that was doing...
on these matters...
it was ignored by the managers
of the capture of decisions.
The vice-president Cheney has done...

... on the war that secretary Rumsfeld. does it have his entire confidence? - This way it is.

...?
The campaign was finished. This way it is. - Will it continue here until you should go away? - This way it is.

Some nights I do not sleep very well... when I blame myself for not pressing any more... that should have gone, to stamp on the door and to say...

" Curse, listening. " It was an error. It is necessary to rectify it ".

But I never had the opportunity... and to stamp on a door... with an ambassador that, essentially, it is...

the czar of Iraq. It is impossible that a colonel does that. beyond the entry.

If the one that I spoke joins, although it is in the most minimal thing... to the criticism of this administration...

I will feel good. I do not want to say that it should have been a cash... but the fact is that I cannot keep on living like that.

We will take to the Iraqis meal... and medicines...

and provisions...

and liberate. Look at what contentments! It sounds as if it us was going away to fall down the world above.

General Garner and I we are.

WE WAN AND WAGES

Now there is Iraqi soldiers...

.

One was a " guerrilla war "....

the different one was a " rebellion ", the different one was a slightly conventional " war ".


- Pardon?
- Impasse.

Not, of that another person takes charge...
I do not do these things.
I penetrate, penetrate.
I hear the political leaders.
Ah!
Below, below, below.
Some day in the future,
I will turn the sight to Iraq...
and I will want to see that we have obtained something...
to be able to say...
that I was a part of that...
and that my suffering
and losses have sense.
If the situation improves, I will go away of Iraq.
I will go away, but now...
I am a combatant, all my life.
will not go away of Iraq.
It is not possible to change anything from here...
because it is out of control.
I do not have plans of future in Iraq.
do not see the light at the end of the tunnel.
This is what exists.
This way we live through it, this way we see it...
this way we it smell and feel it.
In this situation it is not possible to say:
" Let's try this..."
" it will serve. Or this yes that will serve ". It is not like that.
You are saying to me that this
is it the best thing that can do the USA?
Not.
Do not say that to me,
do not say to the marines...
that fought one month in Nayaf that...
Do not say to me that the marines that...
that still fight every day in Faluya...
that this is the best thing
that the USA can do.
It angers me.